



# US-CHINA EXPORTS-IMPORTS AND THE RAGING TARIFF WAR, 2018-2025: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

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## ABSTRACT

The aim of the study is to empirically analyze the US versus China Tariffs war (Exports-Imports impasse). The United States of America (US) and the China tariffs war which has been raging from 2018 to date (2026); has dominated world affairs, that tend to serialize the international economic community with negative effects on the overall international trade. The study is a qualitative one, where document studies method was adopted and utilized in generating data from secondary sources such as academic journals, bulletins, textbooks, scholarly papers, and internet materials. The generated data was analyzed through critical discourse method. The study has established that in spite of the heightened tariffs war, China with \$35.0tr total world exports minus the US recorded as at 2025, which stand at 86%, with only 14% going to the US; has withered the storm of the Tariffs war; where it can do without the US markets by effectively exporting its goods and services to the wider markets of the rest of the countries of the world. So far, the US is the greatest loser in this tariffs war. The study recommends that the US should retract its steps and call off the Tariff war; as well as making China its closest trading partner in the world. When this close and balanced trading affinity is attained between the two largest economies of the world, it will create a more conducive and clean international trading environment.

**KEYWORDS:** Exports, Manufactured Goods, Products, Trade, Global Market.

**JEL Classification:** N20, N60, O1, O47, O57, P16, P33.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The ongoing Tariff war between the United States of America (USA [US]) and China was a backlash of the “China Shock”. The “China Shock” refers to the massive influx of inexpensive Chinese goods into Western markets; and particularly the US; after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Before joining the WTO, China was discreetly hiding behind the ‘iron curtain’ and busy improving and developing its technology (technics), product quality and general diversified manufacturing that exploded and gained acceptability in the international markets, over and above products of other countries including the West; and more specifically the US. This caused significant disruptions in virtually all sectors of the Western economies. The main trigger of the “China Shock” was the granting of ‘Permanent Normal Relations’ (PNTR) to China by the US after joining the WTO. The PNTR dramatically reduces tariffs and opening markets for Chinese products, goods and services in the US and the entire Northern Hemisphere. The effect of the “China Shock” was felt more in the manufacturing sector of the US economy where it resulted in manufacturing job losses, wage stagnation, and economic decline in exposed communities. With lower prices being offered to consumers, it sparks debates about globalization’s uneven impacts and anticipated potential future ‘Shocks’ (in the areas of AI, Robotics, Aviation, and Green Technology [solar batteries]) (Tam, 2020; Wang, Sha, Gu, & Guo, 2026).

The ongoing tariffs war between the US and China, reached its peak in the year 2025, where it was characterized by heightened reciprocal measures by the two tariff combatants. At this point, there was almost a somersault in China’s exports to the US. From a favorable export of \$462.62bn and trade surplus of \$315.62bn in 2024 in favor of China; it dropped drastically to \$23.38bn in the year 2025, leaving a huge export decrease of -\$439.24bn. It resulted into a heightened tension between the two largest economies of the world up to the end of the year 2025. The effect was felt most in the overall global value chains (GVCs) through drastic reduction in global spatial movements of human



capital, goods and services, as well as other vital sectors of the global economy such as the blue economy among others. The heat of the tariffs war is most felt by countries with monocultural economies (with little space for their products) more than the two titans, because China being the main target of the tariff war; was just but peripherally affected. This is based on the fact that China is on a global economic rampage with a very diversified economy as well as widely diversified consumers worldwide; much more than the economic aggressor (US with a dwindling manufacturing sector). The US will soon realize that it has been caught-up in the pitfalls of an emerging “re-routing economic theory” or a ‘trade bye-pass’ (Kwan, 2020; Fajgelbaum, & Khandelwal, 2022; Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy, Khandelwal, & Taglioni 2021; Rieftky, Sabrina, & Revindo, 2025; UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025; Scott, Mokhiber, & Perez, 2020).

Therefore, it is this unnecessary trade war with the potential for future disruption of international trade, a great global economic depression and a very sour international economic relations among allies of the two combatants, that inform the study.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Review of relevant literatures

The tariff war between the US and China has generated academic and intellectual discourse with varied emerging literatures. Among the contributors are the trios of Yang, Lau, and Bahri (2025), who in their study almost concluded that the trade war has dramatically reduced China’s exports to the US, with tariff rises as the principal cause. They recommended the leveraging of multilateral negotiation mechanisms, accelerating industrial upgrading and optimizing trade strategies to address the root causes of trade frictions effectively. For, Rieftky, Sabrina, & Revindo (2025), they stated that the war between the two largest economies - the US and China, has significant and unexpected implications for multinational companies with global value chains (GVCs). They went on to add that, since both markets are closed to each other due to the imposition of higher import tariffs, businesses have to shift their trade activities to alternative countries. Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2021), are of the views that the launching of the trade war by the US on China since 2018, was an abrupt departure from the former’s historical leadership in integrating global markets. Other scholars like Iyoha, Malesky, Wen and Wu (2025), in their joint paper stated that countries are increasingly deploying origin-specific tariffs as geopolitical instruments, and the US-China trade war launched in 2018 is a leading example. In all the above reviewed literatures, there is a gap where all the works failed to highlight on the strong economic strategies adopted by China and its resilience to come out stronger comparatively than the US in the overall global exports of goods and services during the past eight years (2018 to 2025).

### 2.2 Theoretical frameworks

Theory of economic development and comparative advantage theory have been adopted and utilized as frameworks for the study as outlined and treated below:

#### 2.2.1 Economic Development Theory

Economic development theory is a collection of theories that explain how economies grow and develop. Among the economic development theories is Lewis Model (Dual-sector Model). It is a theory in development economic which explains how economic growth gets started through structural change such as – increase in size of the industrial sector relative to subsistence agricultural sector. Lewis’ concern was about labor shortages which seems to inhibit the expansion of the industrial sector. He opines that wages may be low but positive, where higher wages should include inducement. That when the surplus above wage is saved and re-invested, it will in turn increase productivity where more workers are hired. The theory emphasizes the central role of labor (human capital) as the greatest wealth of a nation and of enhancing general economic development. As such, it was adopted as a theoretical framework for the study (Lewis, 1954; Galor, 2009; Watson, 2017).

#### 2.2.2 Comparative Advantage Theory

The second theory adopted as framework for the study is the Comparative Advantage Theory (CAT). Comparative advantage relates to how much productive and cost-efficient a country is over another country in the harnessing of vital resources in the production of finished goods and services. Furthermore, the theory of comparative advantage which is generally known as Heckster-Ohlin theory, is a classical country-based theory which states that countries will gain comparative advantage if they produce and export goods that requires resources or factors that they have in great supply; and cheaper production factors. The differences in factor abundance and the factor intensity of goods must be in favour of the country that possessed them. The CAT states that countries can benefit from international trade by



specializing in producing goods where they have a lower opportunity cost compared to other countries. In another word, it is the ability of a country to produce a particular good or some goods or services at lower opportunity cost than its trading partners. Furthermore, comparative advantage also describes the economic reality of the gains from trade for individuals, firms, or nations; which arise from differences in their endowments or technological progress. The theory emphasizes that countries with advantage in the differences in factor abundance and the factor intensity of goods, often attains absolute advantage where they become more productive, and cost-efficient than other countries (Alting, 1978; Szirmai & Verspagen, 2015; Watson, 2017; Liu, et-al, 2020; Murdock, 2020; Wolde, 2022; Diodato, et-al, 2022; Krusse, et-al, 2023).

### 3. METHODOLOGY

The study adopted qualitative method in generating data. Document studies method was adopted for generating data mainly from secondary sources. The research, which is "US-China Exports-Imports and the Raging Tariff War, 2018-2025: An Empirical Analysis", is essentially descriptive and explanatory. Documents scrutinized in generating data for the study include: UNCTAD-Annual Reports, and World Bank Open Data. Other documents scrutinized include: published materials such as textbooks, academic journals, scholarly papers, and internet materials. The generated narrative data was analyzed through critical discourse method. Numerical data obtained from verifiable sources such as World Bank Open Data on exports, and UNCTAD-Annual Reports were computed for the period of the study by the researcher and presented in tabular and graphical forms. The generation and computation of statistical data from verifiable sources which are expertly handled, goes to guarantee its validity. The critical discourse analysis utilized descriptive and explanatory method by drawing inference from the data.

### 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Results from data generated mainly from secondary sources through document studies method on US-China Exports, Imports, and Tariffs imposition are as presented and discussed in the succeeding paragraphs:

#### 4.1 United States Exports and Imports of Goods and Services to and from China, 2018-2025

The exports-imports of the US for the period 2018 when the Tariff war with China was launched, up to 2025 are as empirically presented and discussed. The US exported \$120.1bn worth of goods and services in 2018 to China; while it imported \$520.0bn worth of goods and services from China in the same year. This gives China an upper hand with a trade surplus of +\$399.9bn; while the US recorded trade deficit of -\$399.9bn for the same year. In the year 2019, the US exported \$106.6bn worth of goods and services to China; while it imported \$452.2bn worth of goods and services in the same year. China also is the greatest gainer here with a trade surplus of +\$345.66bn; while the US recorded trade deficit of -\$345.66bn for the same year. In 2020, the US exported goods and services worth \$164.9bn to China; while, it imported \$450.4bn worth of goods and services. On the other hand, it (US) recorded deficit of -\$245.5; while, China posted a surplus of +\$245.5bn. The US's exports of goods and services to China in 2021 stand at \$151.1.9bn; while it imported \$506.4bn worth of goods and services from China in the same year. Where in the same year, the US recorded trade deficit of -\$355.3bn; China gained with a surplus of +355.3bn. In the year 2022, US imports from China stand at \$153.8bn; where its exports stand at \$436.8bn. The US in the same 2022 recorded trade deficit of -\$283.0bn; and China recording trade surplus of +\$283.0bn for the same year. In the year 2023, the US exported \$279.4bn worth of goods and services to China and imported \$427.8bn goods and services from China. This leaves the US with a trade deficit of -\$193.4bn; while gained with a surplus of +\$193.4bn for the same year. The US exported \$147.0bn goods and services in 2024; while, it imported \$462.62bn in the same year. The US recorded deficit of -\$315.62bn; while, recorded trade surplus of +315.62bn in the same 2024. As the Tariff war rages higher, the trade between the two countries drastically dropped in the year 2025; where the US exports dropped to \$8.38bn and its imports from China also dropped to \$23.38bn (Tam, 2020; Li, Balistreri & Zhang, 2020; UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025).

China's total cumulative exports surplus stand at +\$1,907.22bn. While the US total cumulative export deficit stand at -\$1,907.22bn. The total increase imports for China, is +\$105.85bn, and total decrease is -\$587.44bn; with an overall cumulative import decrease of -\$481.59bn (overall trade surplus); which in essence is to the great advantage for China over the US. The US total exports increase is +\$196.9bn, and total decrease is -\$298.3bn; giving an overall cumulative decrease of -\$101.4bn. As the result of the raging tariff war, the US recorded trade deficit of -\$15.0bn; with China recording trade surplus of +\$15.0bn for same year 2025; the lowest trade volumes for the two warring countries since 2018 (Crowley, Meng, & Song, 2018; UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025).



Nonetheless, in spite of the Tariff war waged on China by the US for the past eight years; China has, and will continue to have comparative competitive advantage over the US in terms of exports of goods and services; because of the availability of raw materials, abundant cheap labor in the production process; improved quality of processed goods and services; and low cost of finished products code-named the “China Shock.” Such that even American consumers now prefer Chinese products at the expense of American products (Huld, 2025; Meng, Gao, Zhang, Ye, & Zhang, 2025; Hlovor, & Mawuko-Yevugah, 2025).

This performance (statistically) of the US exports-imports with China is as presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 below:


Table 1: US Exports and Imports of Goods and Services to and from China, 2018-2025 (\$bn)

SN	Year	Exports	Increase Rate	Decrease Rate	Surplus/ Deficit	Imports	Increase Rate	Decrease Rate	Surplus/ Deficit
1.	2018	120.1	+10.3		-399.9 USA, +399.9, China	520.0	+15.0		+399.9, China -399.9 USA
2.	2019	106.6		-13.5	-345.66 USA, +345.66 China	452.2		-67.8	+345.0 China -345.0 USA
3.	2020	164.9	+58.3		-285.5 USA +285.5 China	450.4		-1.8	+285.5 China -285.5 USA
4.	2021	151.1		-13.8	-355.3 USA +355.3 China	506.4	+56.0		+355.3 China -355.3 USA
5.	2022	153.8	+2.7		-283.0 USA +283.0 China	436.8		-69.6	+283.0 China -282.0 USA
6.	2023	279.4	+125.6		-193.4 USA +193.4 China	427.8		-9.0	+193.4 China -193.4 USA
7.	2024	147.0		-132.4	-315.62 USA +315.62 China	462.62	+34.85		+315.62 China -315.62 USA
8.	2025	8.38		-138.6	-15.0 USA, +15.0 China	23.38		-439.24	+15.0 China -15.0 USA
	USA Total	1,131.28	+196.9	-298.3	-1,907.22 USA +1,907.22 China	3,279.6	+105.85	-587.44	+1,907.22 China -1,907.22 USA
	Balance			-101.4				-481.59	
	World	190.3				\$191.03			

Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2025 as adapted from: UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025.

Fig 1:

US Exports and Imports of Goods and Services to and from China, 2018-2025 (\$bn)



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2025 as adapted from: UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025.



#### 4.2 China Exports and Imports of Goods and Services to and from the US, 2018-2025

With the tariff war, the People's Republic of China exported \$520.0bn worth of goods and services to the US in 2018; while it imported \$120.1bn worth of goods and services from the US in the same year. This gives China an upper hand with a trade surplus of +\$399.9bn; while the US recorded trade deficit of -\$399.9bn for the same year. China in 2019, exported \$452.2bn worth of goods and services to the US; while it imported \$106.6bn worth of goods and services from the US in the same year. China also is the greatest gainer here with a trade surplus of +\$345.66bn. The US recorded trade deficit of -\$345.66bn for the same year. China's exports to the US in 2020, stand at \$450.4bn; while it imported goods and services worth \$164.9bn from the US in the same year. For the same year, China recorded surplus of +\$245.5; while the US posted a deficit of -\$245.5bn. China's exports of goods and services to the US in 2021 stand at \$506.4bn and it imported \$151.1bn from the latter. In the same year, China recorded trade surplus of +\$355.3bn; while the US recorded trade deficit of -355.3bn. In the year 2022, China's exports to the US stand at \$436.8bn; and it imported \$153.8bn of goods and services from the latter. China in the same 2022 recorded trade surplus of +\$283.0bn; and the US recorded trade deficit of -\$283.0bn for the same year. In the year 2023, China exported \$427.8bn worth of goods and services to the US; while its imports stand at \$279.4bn worth of goods and services from the US. This gives China a trade surplus of +\$193.4bn; while the US recorded trade deficit of -\$193.4bn for the same year. In 2024, China's exports of goods and services to the US stand at \$462.62bn; while its imports stand at \$147.0bn for the same year. China recorded trade surplus of +\$315.62bn in 2024; leaving the US with a deficit of -\$315.62bn. The intensity of the Tariff war between the US and China, resulted in dwindling trade between the two countries throughout the year 2025; where China's exports dropped to \$23.38bn and that of China dropped to \$8.38bn. This unhealthy development has overall negative effect for overall international trade (Riefky, Sabrina, & Revindo, 2025; Itakura, 2020).


China's total cumulative export surplus stand at +\$1,907.22bn; leaving the US with export deficit of -\$1,907.22bn for the period covered by this study. The total increase of imports for China is +\$105.85bn, and total decrease is -\$587.44bn; with overall cumulative imports decrease of -\$481.59bn. which is the actual trade surplus for China. The US recorded trade deficit of -\$15.0bn; with China recording surplus of +\$15.0bn for same year 2025. Though the US recorded a total exports increase of +\$196.9bn, but its total decrease of -\$298.3bn outweighed the increase; leaving it with an overall cumulative decrease balance of -\$101.4bn for the period of eight years covered by the study (UNCTAD, 2025; Kwan, 2020; Huld, 2025; Iyoha, Malesky, Wen, & Wu, 2024).

This is as presented in Table 2 and Figure 2 below:

**Table 2: China Exports and Imports of Goods and Services to and from the US, 2018-2025 (\$bn)**

SN	Year	Exports	Increase Rate	Decrease Rate	Surplus/ Deficit	Imports	Increase Rate	Decrease Rate	Surplus/ Deficit
1.	2018	\$520.0	+15.0		-399.9 USA, +399.9, China	\$120.1	+10.3		+399.9, China -399.9 USA
2.	2019	\$452.2		-67.8	-345.66 USA, +345.0 China	\$106.6		-13.5	+345.0 China -345.0 USA
3.	2020	\$450.4		-1.8	-285.5 USA +285.5 China	\$164.9	+58.3		+285.5 China -285.5 USA
4.	2021	\$506.4	+56.9		-355.3 USA +355.3 China	\$151.1		-13.8	+355.3 China -355.3 USA
5.	2022	\$436.8		-69.6	-283.0 USA +283.0 China	\$153.8	+2.7		+283.0 China -282.0 USA
6.	2023	\$427.8		-9.0	-193.4 USA +193.4 China	\$279.4	+125.6		+193.4 China -193.4 USA
7.	2024	\$462.62	+34.85		-315.62 USA +315.62 China	\$147.0		-132.4	+315.62 China -315.62 USA
8.	2025	\$23.38		-439.24	-15.0 USA, +15.0 China	\$8.38		-138.6	+15.0 China -15.0 USA
	China Total	\$3,279.6	+105.85	-587.44	-1,907.22 USA +1,907.22 China	\$1,131.28	+196.9	-298.3	+1,907.22 China -1,907.22 USA
	Balance			-481.59				-101.4	
	World	\$190,3tr				\$191,03t			

Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2025 as adapted from: UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025.



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2025 as adapted from: UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025.

### 4.3 Summary of US and China Exports-Imports of Goods and Services, 2018-2025

The US cumulative imports from China between 2018 and 2025 stand at \$3,279.6trillion with an annual average of \$409.95bn. While, the US cumulative exports to China for the same period stand at \$1,131.28bn with an annual average of \$141.41bn for the past eight years (2018-2025). The world imports annual average stands \$28.16trillion, while the world exports annual average stand at \$28.31trillion for the period covered by the study. In spite of the high intensity of the trade war, China still records a very high comparative advantage over the US with a trade surplus of +\$2,148.32bn for the period of the study. While, the US, which fired the first shot for the tariff battle ended up with a very huge cumulative total trade deficit of -\$2,148.32bn for the same period. The international economic relations strategies adopted by China are still illusionary to the US international economic relations strategists and national economic intelligentsias. However, the highest exports decrease for China was recorded in the 2024-2025 trading years where China's exports to the US dropped from \$462.62bn in 2024 to \$28.38bn in 2025 resulting into a total cumulative decrease of -\$439.24bn. Ironically, the US also is a great loser in the same 2024-2025 trading years, where its exports to China plummeted to a record low of \$8.38bn in 2025 from \$147.0bn recorded in 2024 with a total cumulative decrease of -\$298.3bn for the same period. If wars are strategically waged for greatest benefits in economic or political terms; then the colossus of the US national economic advisers, political analysts, and international economic relations strategists, have all failed the Trump administration, by underrating the capability of the ever-growing Chinese international economic relations strategists, that have long prepared for this; and adequately developed the necessary strong 'shock-absorbers' to withstand it or any other economic war for that matter. The anticipatory stance adopted by China on all global issues is what makes a nation gain more strength. Whereas, arrogance in prosecuting international issues, is an indication of dissipating sovereign state power; or to put it more succinctly – 'it is a nation with a strong leader surrounded by surrogates' (Iyoha, Malesky, Wen, & Wu, 2024; Hlovor, & Mawuko-Yevugah, 2025). Finally, US total cumulative exports to China for the period of the study stands at 5%; where in the same vein, China's exports to the US stands at 15%. Similarly, the US imports from China stand at 15%, while China's imports from the US stand at 5% and vice versa (Kwan, 2920; Tam, 2020; Itakura, 2020).




All these are as presented in Table 3 and Figures 3 & 4 as presented below:

**Table 3: Summary of US-China Exports-Imports of Goods and Services to and from China, 2018-2025 (\$bn/tr)**

SN	Year	USA Cumulative Imports	USA Imports CAA	USA Cumulative Exports	USA Exports CAA	World Cumulative Imports	World Imports CAA	World Cumulative Exports	World Exports CAA
1.	2018	\$520.0	409.95	\$120.1	141.41	24.62tr	28.163tr	25.3tr	28.31tr
2.	2019	\$452.2	409.95	\$106.6	141.41	24.30	28.163tr	24.99tr	28.31tr
3.	2020	\$450.4	409.95	\$164.9	141.41	21.87	28.163tr	22.58tr	28.31tr
4.	2021	\$506.4	409.95	\$151.1	141.41	27.14	28.163tr	28.31tr	28.31tr
5.	2022	\$436.8	409.95	\$153.8	141.41	30.80	28.163tr	26.0tr	28.31tr
6.	2023	\$427.8	409.95	\$279.4	141.41	30.29	28.163tr	31.27tr	28.31tr
7.	2024	\$462.62	409.95	\$147.0	141.41	31.28	28.163tr	33.0tr	28.31tr
8.	2025	\$23.38	409.95	\$8.38	141.41	35.0tr	28.163tr	35.0tr	28.31tr
	USA	\$3,279.6	\$3,279.6	\$1,131.28	\$1,131.28	225.3tr	225.3tr	226.45tr	226.45tr
	World	226.45tr	226.45tr	225.3tr	225.3tr	225.3tr	225.3tr	226.45tr	226.45tr

Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2025 as adapted from: UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025.


**Fig 3: Summary of US-China Exports-Imports of Goods and Services to and from China, 2018-2025 (%)**



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2025 as adapted from: UNCTAD-AR, 2025; BRICS-JSP, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025

Fig. 4:

Summary of US and China Exports-Imports of Goods and Services, 2018-2025 (\$bn in tr)



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2025 as adapted from: UNCTAD-AR, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025

#### 4.4 US Tariffs (& % Values) Imposed on Goods and Services Imported from China, 2018-2025

Since the imports tariff war was launched on China by the US from 2018 to 2025, the highest imposed imports tariff percentages and annual tariff percentage values (TPV) on Chinese goods and services were recorded for three years as follows: 2021 with 67% and TPV of \$339.29bn; 2024 also with 67%, but with a TPV of \$309.96bn; and 2019 also with 67%, but with a TPV of \$302.97bn. The second level of years with high percentage (%) and TPV are: 2020 with 66% and TPV of \$299.07bn; and 2022 also with 66%, but with TPV of \$290.91bn. The year 2023 is next with 62% and TPV of \$265.24bn. The year 2018 recorded 48.1% and TPV of \$250.12bn. While, the year 2025 with 47.5% and TPV of \$11.11bn is the least and worse for the US government’s anticipated external revenue from China (Itakura, 2020; Fajgelbaum, & Khandelwal, 2022; Wang, Sha, Gu, & Guo, 2026; Kwan, 2020; World Bank Open Data, 2025; UNCTAD, 2025).

Therefore, the total cumulative Tariffs percentage values (TPV) on imports from China stands at \$2,069.29tr, representing 63.1% of total cumulative imports from China which stands at \$3,279.6tr for the period 2018-2025 (8 years). This is a very huge cut-back on China gains)) in this regard (with the potential of wiping off the profit margin). The annual average percentage (%) Tariffs on Chinese imports stand at 61.6% with a total cumulative annual average percentage of 491.6%. Value of annual average percentage (%) of US Tariffs imposed on imports from China stands at \$258.66bn representing 7.9% of the total cumulative imports from China which stands \$3,279.6tr (UNCTAD, 2025; Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy, Khandelwal, & Taglioni 2021, Riefky, Sabrina, & Revindo, 2025; Yang, Lau, Bahri, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025).

This is as presented in Table 4 and Figure 7 below:


**Table 6: US Tariffs Percentage Values Imposed on Goods and Services Imported from China, 2018-2025 (\$tr & %)**

S N	Year	USA Cumulative Imports from China	% of Tariffs on Imports from China	Value of Tariffs % on imports from China	Average % Tariffs on imports from China	Value of Average % Tariffs on Imports from China
1.	2018	\$520.0	48.1%	\$250.12bn	61.6%	\$258.66bn
2.	2019	\$452.2	67%	\$302.97bn	61.6%	\$24.30bn
3.	2020	\$450.4	66.4%	\$299.07bn	61.6%	\$258.66bn
4.	2021	\$506.4	67%	\$339.29bn	61.6%	\$258.66bn
5.	2022	\$436.8	66.6%	\$290.91bn	61.6%	\$258.66bn
6.	2023	\$427.8	62%	\$265.24bn	61.6%	\$258.66bn
7.	2024	\$462.62	67%	\$309.96bn	61.6%	\$258.66bn
8.	2025	\$23.38	47.5%	\$11.11bn	61.6%	\$258.66bn
	Total	\$3,279.6	491.6%	\$ 2,069.29tr	491.6%	\$2,069.29tr
	World	226.45tr	226,45tr	225.3tr	225.3tr	225.3tr

Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2025 as adapted from: UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025.

**Fig. 7:**

**US Tariffs Percentage Value Imposed on Goods and Services Imported from China, 2018-2025 (\$bn)**



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2025 as adapted from: UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025.

#### 4.5 Summary of China’s Total World Annual Exports of Goods and Services, 2018-2025

As the tariff war rages, China stunned its adversaries with a total cumulative world export to other countries (excluding the US) in 2025, with a surprisingly high performance of \$3.790tr, with the lowest exports to the US which stand at



\$28.38bn. China recorded its highest overall total world exports (including the US) of \$35.0bn in the same year 2025. China recorded its second highest overall world exports (OWE) of goods and services in the year 2024 with \$33.0bn. In the year 2023 China recorded \$31.27bn from the overall world exports of goods and services. China's overall world exports for the remaining years in the descending order are as follows: in 2021 it recorded \$28.31tr; in 2022 it recorded \$26.0tr; in 2018 it recorded \$25.3tr; in 2019 it recorded \$24.99tr; and the lowest performance in 2020 where it recorded \$22.58tr. China's world exports (-USA) annual average stand at \$3.194tr. While, China's overall exports to the world annual average stand at \$28.32tr. As earlier stated, China's exports to the US annual average stand at \$409.95bn (\$0.410tr). So far, only 11.37% of China's total overall cumulative world exports of goods and services went to the US between 2018 and 2025; while 88.63% of China's total cumulative exports of goods and services went to the rest of the countries of the world for the same period. The implication of this is that, with or without the US markets, Chinese goods and services have unlimited global market spaces. As such, the US should tread with utmost caution so as not to fall into 'globalization somersault' and total domestic economic collapse or crash (Hlovor, & Mawuko-Yevugah, 2025; Diodato, Hausmann, & Schetter, 2022; Fajgelbaum, & Khandelwal, (2021; Tam, 2020; UNCTAD, 2025; Krusse, et-al, 2023; Wang, Sha, Gu, & Guo, 2026; Worl Bank Open Data, 2025; Meng, Guo, Zhang, Ye, & Zhang, 2025).


This is as presented in Table 7 and Figure 8 below:

**Table 7: China's Total World Annual Exports of Goods and Services, 2018-2025 (tr)**

Year	China World Exports (Excluding US)	China Exports to US	Balance	China World Exports (-US) Annual Average	China Exports to US Annual Average	World Exports General	World Exports General Annual Average	China Total World Exports	% of China Total World Exports
2018	\$2.490tr	\$520.0bn	\$1.880tr	\$3.194tr	\$409.95bn	25.3tr	\$28.31tr	\$3.010tr	11%
2019	\$2.800tr	\$452.2bn	\$2.34tr	\$3.194tr	\$409.95bn	24.99tr	\$28.31t	\$3,252tr	13%
2020	\$2.730tr	\$450.4bn	\$2.28tr	\$3.194tr	\$409.95bn	22.58tr	\$28.31t	\$3,180bn	14%
2021	\$2.760tr	\$506.4bn	\$2.25tr	\$3.194tr	\$409.95bn	28.31tr	\$28.31t	\$3.266tr	11%
2022	\$3.718tr	\$436.8bn	\$3.28tr	\$3.194tr	\$409.95bn	26.0tr	\$28.31t	\$t4.154r	16%
2023	\$3.513tr	\$427.8bn	\$3.09tr	\$3.194tr	\$409.95bn	31.27tr	\$28.31t	\$3.940tr	12%
2024	\$3.753tr	\$462.62bn	\$3.29bn	\$3.194tr	\$409.95bn	33.0tr	\$28.31t	\$4.216tr	12%
2025	\$3.790tr	\$23.38bn	\$3.56tr	\$3.194tr	\$409.95bn	35.0tr	\$28.31t	\$3.813tr	11%
Total	\$25.555tr (11.29%)	\$3.279.6tr (1.45%)	\$21.978tr 9.72%	\$25.555tr	\$3,279.6tr	226.45tr	\$226.45tr	\$28.833tr	100%

Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2025 as adapted from: UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025.

**Fig. 8:**  
**China's Total World Annual Exports of Goods and Services, 2018-2025 (tr)**



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2025 as adapted from: UNCTAD, 2025; World Bank Open Data, 2025.  
Key: AA = Annual Average

## 5. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of major findings, conclusion and recommendations are as presented below:

### 5.1 Major Findings

From the analysis so far, the following major findings have been sieved:

1. The study has established that the total exports increase for China is +\$587.44bn and total decrease is -\$105.85bn; with an overall cumulative export increase balance of +\$481.59bn for the period of eight years (2018-2025).
2. The study has also established that, although the US recorded a total exports increase of +\$196.9bn, but its total decrease of -\$298.3bn outweighed the increase; leaving it with an overall cumulative decrease balance of -\$101.4bn for the period of eight years covered by the study.
3. The study has further established that the US cumulative imports from China between 2018 and 2025 stand at \$3,279.6trillion with an annual average of \$409.95bn. While, the US cumulative exports to China for the same period stand at \$1,131.28bn with an annual average of \$141.41bn for the past eight years (2018-2025). With trade surplus of \$2,147.8tr, China has withered the storm of the tariff war with a comparative competitive advantage over the US.
4. The study has also established that the total cumulative Tariffs Percentage Values (TPV) on imports from China stands at \$2,069.29tr, representing 63.1% of total cumulative imports from China which stands at \$3,279.6tr for the period 2018-2025 (8 years). This is highly injurious to China in terms of profit margin.
5. The study has also established that for the period of the eight years (2018-2025), China's overall total cumulative exports (including US) stand at \$28.833tr (12.73% of world cumulative total exports); while its cumulative exports (excluding the US) stand at \$25.555bn (11.28% of world cumulative total exports). This gives a difference of \$3.279tr (1.45% of world cumulative total exports), which represents China's cumulative total exports to the US for the same period. This comparatively high world exports percentage recorded by China in spite of the intensity of the US tariff war, proves its resilience and, a focused international economic relations strategy.



- The study has further established that between 2018 and 2025, only 11.37% of China's total overall cumulative exports of goods and services went to the US; while 88.63% of China's total cumulative exports of goods and services went to the markets of other countries of the world. This means that China can do without US markets.

## 5.2 Conclusion

From the summary of the major findings, conclusion can be drawn that China armed with resilience, has withered the storm of the Tariff war fostered on it by the US; and can do without the US markets by effectively exporting its goods and services to the rest of the countries of the world. This is based on the fact that only 11.37% of China's total overall cumulative world exports went to the US markets. While, 88.63% of China's total overall cumulative exports went to the rest of the countries of the world.

## 5.3 Recommendations

By way of recommendations, the US which was instrumental in re-integrating China into the global trading (economic) system by ensuring its entry into WTO in 2001; should retract its steps and call off the Tariff war; as well as making China its closest trading partner in the world. When this close and balanced trading affinity is attained between the two largest economies of the world, it will lead to a more conducive international trading environment.

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